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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20060045-CA

MARC CLIFTON BRYANT,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the erred in allowing testimony on rebuttal that Bryant and the other
defense witnesses were white supremacists when such evidence was filled with hearsay,
was remote and speculative, and was clearly more prejudicial than probative? This issue
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239
(Utah App. 1997). "[T]trial courts have wide discretion in determining relevance,
probative value, and prejudice.'" State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 20,112, 63 P.3d 72 (quoting
State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, <J[ 27, 61 P.3d 1019). This Court '"will not reverse the trial
court's ruling on evidentiary issues unless it is manifest that the trial court so abused its
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discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted.'" Id. (quoting State v. Gentry,
747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1987)).
This issue was preserved in an objection raised at trial (R. 161: 138-39); and was
raised in a motion to arrest judgment (R. 123-24). Alternatively, it should be reviewed
under a plain error standard or for ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish plain
error, Bryant must demonstrate that an obvious and harmful error should have existed to
the trial court. State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah App. 1997). To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, Bryant must establish that counsel's performance was
deficient and he was prejudiced as a result. However, when both plain error and
ineffectiveness of counsel are raised in regards to the same issue, then a common
standard of review applies. State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(stating common standard of review is applicable when defendant raises both plain error
and ineffective assistance arguments).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The text of all relevant statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the
Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case

Marc Clifton Bryant appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment of the
Fifth Judicial District Court after being convicted of Assault by a Prisoner, a third degree
felony.
2

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

Bryant was charged by Information filed in Fifth District Court with Assault by a
Prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-102.5 (R. 1).
A Preliminary Hearing was held on February 28, 2005 after which the trial court bound
Bryant over on the charge (R. 20, 22-23, 163: 13-14). Bryant was formally arraigned on
March 15, 2005 and entered a not guilty plea (R. 24).
A jury trial was held on May 20, 2005 (R. 75-76, 161). Immediately prior to trial,
After deliberation, the jury returned with a verdict of guilty as charged (R. 76, 98).
On September 9, 2005 Bryant filed a Motion to Arrest Judgment (R. 115, 117-24).
After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 134, 162)
Bryant was sentenced on January 3, 2006 to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison
with credit for 163 days previously served (R. 146-50, 165).
Bryant filed a Notice of Appeal in Fifth District Court on January 9, 2006 (R.
151).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A. Testimony of Mack Harris
Mack Edward Harris, Jr. testified that he knows Bryant from being an inmate at
the purgatory facility (R. 161: 64). On February 1, 2005 Harris was housed in C block at
the Purgatory Correctional facility, which was a two-man, enclosed cell; and Bryant was
3

his cellmate (R. 161: 65). The door to the 8 by 12 cell is made of steel with a small
window for the guards to look through when doing checks (Id.).
Harris testified that he and Bryant "wasn't getting along too well" (R. 161: 66).
Bryant wanted the bottom bunk and he wanted to use Harris' stool to get up on his bunk
rather than using his desk to climb (Id.). Harris claimed that Bryant tried to "bully me
out to take over the bottom bunk" (R. 161: 66). Harris testified that Bryant was "trying
to control the situation instead of him trying to get along with me and talk about things,
he either wanted things his way, and if it wasn't his way—like the statement he made one
night, 'We're going to fight in here,' if he don't get things his way, you know" (R. 161:
67).
On the evening of February 1, 2005 Harris ate his supper at his desk in the cell
after lock down between 7:15 and 7:30 p.m. (R. 161: 67-68). He'd been placed on
restrictions that day but claimed it didn't upset or bother him (R. 161: 84). Bryant
"jumped up on his bunk and he swung his foot around over my plate where I was eating
at to put his socks on. I asked him not to do it, and he pretty much started cussing at me
telling me, you know, T you,'.... There was a boiling pound—a boiling point [in Bryant]
getting ready to explode" (R. 161: 68). Harris was also upset about being disrespected by
Bryant swinging his naked feet over his plate (R. 161: 68-69). Bryant then jumped off
the top bunk and "got in my face" (R. 161: 69). Harris accused Bryant of disrespecting
him while Bryant continued to ask, "What do you want to do about it?" (R. 161: 69).
Harris testified that Bryant walked towards him and then swung at him (R. 161:
69). Specifically, Harris testified that Bryant "took his fists and launched out and hit me"
4

in the back of the head (R. 161: 69). Harris pushed him away and they began "tussling in
the cell" (Id.). Harris claimed that after Bryant hit him, he was "trying to defend" himself
so he was hitting Bryant and pushing him away because Bryant kept lunging at him and
hitting him (R. 161: 70, 72). This initial altercation lasted 1-2 minutes and then there was
separation for a couple of seconds (R. 161: 71).
Harris testified he moved over by the door and Bryant grabbed him around the
neck (R. 161: 72-73). Harris grabbed and pushed back (R. 161: 73). Bryant then kneed
Harris in the groin and tripped him before getting on top of him and hitting him (R. 161:
70, 73). The two of them had moved back towards Harris' desk (R. 161: 74). Harris
testified that, "He took one of my arms and wrapped it around the bottom stool of the
desk. He enlarged one of my arms, and then he had both—so while he was holding my
arm down and lodged around the stool, that's when he kept hitting on me. I told him it
was enough, that was enough, and he kept hitting me" (R. 161: 74). The stool was bolted
into the cement floor (R. 161: 74). Finally, Bryant stopped and turned around (R. 161:
75). Harris got up off the floor and called for a deputy through the speaker by the toilet
area, stating Bryant had attacked him (R. 161: 75).
After Harris alerted the deputies to the problem, the cell door opened and Bryant
exited (R. 161: 76). Harris testified that Bryant, "Walked up and down the tier and was
telling everybody in the cellblock that I was a rat, that I hit the button..." and that
somebody "should take care of him" (R. 161: 76). Harris was subsequently told to pack
his belongings and was taken to medical (R. 161: 76-77).
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Afterwards Harris was placed in A block, which is lockdown, where Bryant was
already located (R. 161: 77). Over Bryant's objection, Harris testified that when he got to
A block, Bryant "was yelling through his cellblock" and saying, "No matter what—no
matter where you are or, you know, any time you—if you go to class or do anything, I'm
going to get you. You better tell them it was horseplay" (R. 161: 78).
Harris testified that he received two black eyes, a cut below one eye and across the
bridge of his nose, scratches on his arm and that he chipped a bone in his elbow in the
altercation with Bryant (R. 161: 79-80). State's Exhibits 1-3 are photographs of Harris
taken by jail staff on the night of the fight (R. 161: 80). Bryant objected to the
introduction of State's Exhibit #2 as cumulative, gruesome, and prejudicial (R. 161: 81).
The trial court overruled the objection, stating, "Counsel, I've not seen the photographs,
but the Court is going to overrule the objection. The Court is going to admit State's
Exhibits 1, 2, and 3" (R. 161: 81). In regards to State's Exhibits 1 and 2, counsel for the
State admitted that the two photographs "show pretty much the same" injuries to the face
but from separate angles (R. 161: 82). Exhibit #2 is a close-up. Harris testified that he
wasn't aware of any injuries sustained by Bryant (R. 161: 82).
Harris denied ever being the aggressor in the altercation (R. 161: 75-76, 78-79).
However, he admitted to having a history of assaultive behavior (R. 161: 78). In 1996,
2001, and 2002 he pled guilty to simple assault (R. 161: 84-85). In 2002 he pled guilty to
attempted aggravated assault (R. 161: 85). And in 2004, he pled guilty to assault by a
prisoner in 2004 from another incident at Purgatory (R. 161: 78, 85).
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B. Testimony of Justin Seegmiller
Justin Seegmiller is employed by the Washington County Sheriff's Office and was
working at Purgatory Correctional Facility on February 1, 2005 (R. 161: 86-87). Inmates
do not have a choice about cellmates (R. 161: 94). In addition, fights and disagreements
among inmates are very common (R. 161: 95). Although inmates are technically
assigned a bunk, in practice bunk choice is typically decided between inmates (R. 161:
98).
That evening Seegmiller and Deputy Hansen were doing a cell check and heard on
the radio that there was a fight, and that the parties had been separated in C block (R.
161: 87-88). The two deputies are on the Mobile Roaming Team where they are
constantly walking through the facility doing (R. 161: 94). They responded to C block
and Seegmiller told Bryant to come down the stairs from where he'd been on the top tier
to speak with them (R. 161: 88).
Seegmiller testified that Bryant told them that it was just "a couple of adults horse
playing and no big deal" (R. 161: 88). Seegmiller observed some marks and blood on
Bryant's hand down by the knuckle area and marks on his shoulder (R. 161: 88-89).
Bryant's comment when asked about the marks and blood "was he was just picking
pimples" (R. 161: 89). Bryant "was upfront" and "didn't have any attitude" towards the
deputies (R. 161: 89). Bryant was escorted down to medical because the abrasions or
marks were significant enough that they needed to be checked (R. 161: 89-90).
At this time Harris was in his cell pacing (R. 161: 90). Seegmiller indicated that
there were multiple inmates yelling "F-ing rat" so they had Harris pack up his belongings
7

and asked him what happened (R. 161: 90). Seegmiller testified that Harris "looked like
he had been hit by a truck" (R. 161: 90). He face was red and swollen and it looked like
"he had hit the pavement pretty hard" (R. 161: 90).
When asked by the prosecutor to compare Harris' injuries with those of Bryant,
Seegmiller said, "Bryant's was very minimal compared to Mack Harris'" (R. 161: 91).
Bryant objected to this question on grounds of relevance (R. 161: 91). The State argued,
"it goes to who was the aggressor in the situation" (R. 161:91). The Court found
overruled the objection finding that the question and answer was relevant (R. 161: 91).
C. Testimony of Barrel McCoy
Darrel McCoy is a correctional officer at Purgatory (R. 161: 100). He assisted in
the investigation of the altercation between Harris and Bryant on February 1, 2005 (R.
161: 100). After McCoy arrived at the cellblock the two inmates had been separated (R.
161: 101, 103). He ordered Bryant to come to the entrance door (R. 161: 101). Bryant
tore up the official witness statement form he was given by McCoy, but told him that "he
and his cellmate were horse playing" (R. 161: 102, 104). Bryant tore it up because "he
had forgotten what happened" although the altercation happened no more than an hour
previous (R. 161: 104). It is not unusual for inmates to decline to fill out such forms (R.
161: 106). McCoy observed some minor cuts and abrasions on Bryant's neck and left
hand(R. 161: 102).
McCoy also observed Harris and thought, "he looked a little more involved in the
altercation" because of the swelling to his face and abrasions—meaning that there was
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more to the altercation than "just horse playing" (R. 161: 103). Harris was in his cell
"pacing back and forth" (R. 161: 105).
D. Testimony of Gene Redford
Gene Redford is a corporal with the Washington County Sheriff's Office who
supervises deputies at Purgatory (R. 161: 107-08). On February 1, 2005 he was involved
with investigating the altercation between Bryant and Harris (R. 161: 108). Altercations
between inmates are not unusual (R. 161: 112). Redford saw Bryant in medical and
noticed that he had some scrapes on his knuckles and small red marks on him (R. 161:
108-09). Bryant informed Redford that the incident was "horseplay" (R. 161: 109).
State's Exhibit #4 is a photograph of Bryant's left hand (R. 161: 109).
Before speaking with Bryant, Redford went to the scene (R. 161: 111). Redford
saw Harris in the corridor and noticed that his face was swollen and he had a cut under
his eye (R. 161: 111). Harris' injuries were a "little bit more extensive" than Bryant's (R.
161: 111).
E. Testimony of Mack Harris during Defense's Case
Harris admitted that prior to the altercation with Bryant, he had requested a change
in cells and that so had Bryant (R. 161: 114-15). Harris is forty years-old, stands 6'2"
tall, and weighed approximately 170 pounds at the time (R. 161: 115).
F. Testimony of Jared Eskelsen
Jared Eskelsen testified that he has been an inmate at Purgatory since November
of 2004 (R. 161: 117). On February 1, 2005 he was housed in a cell next to Bryant (R.
161: 117). He was housed next to Bryant for approximately two weeks (R. 161: 117).
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Eskelsen couldn't see into that cell but he could "pretty much catch every other word"
that was said even of a light conversation (R. 161: 117).
Eskelsen said that just about every night Bryant and Harris would argue (R. 161:
118). On February 1, 2005 he heard "a lot of arguing, and then it led to fighting" (R.
161: 118). He heard Harris tell Bryant "don't hang your feet over my bed. You know,
this is my space. If you don't like it you can move out, and you know, stuff like that" (R.
161: 118). Eskelsen then heard Harris call Bryant "a bitch" and then later heard Bryant
state, "Don't hit me, Mack" (R. 161: 118-19). Afterwards, he heard wrestling, banging
against the walls, and then "[tjhey came over the speaker and told Marc he needed to exit
the cell" (R. 161: 119). The scuffling went on for 4-5 minutes (R. 161: 119): When
Bryant left the cell, he walked around the top tier for 15-20 minutes before an officer
actually came to assist (R. 161: 121). Eskelsen never heard anyone call Harris "a F-ing
rat" (R. 161: 122).
G. Testimony of John Rupp
John Rupp was incarcerated at the time of trial and was an inmate in Purgatory in
late January of 2005 (R. 161: 123). Rupp is acquainted with both Harris and Bryant (R.
161: 123-24). Rupp often observed Harris "putting his hands on other people, one of
them being Mr. Marc Bryant" (R. 161: 124). Rupp described this touching as, "[S]ort of
offensive like pushing around, you know, but you weren't sure whether he was joking or
if he was serious" (R. 161: 124). Rupp never observed Harris strike Bryant (R. 161:
125). Rupp never saw Bryant push or touch Harris (R. 161: 125-26).
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H. Testimony of Anthony Tullius
Anthony Tullius is also an inmate at Purgatory who was likewise an inmate during
late January and early February of 2005 (R. 161: 127). Tullius knows Harris and Bryant
(R. 161: 127). He observed them interact when they were cellmates and he was housed
in the same section (R. 161: 127). "It was kind of agitated time when they were being
cellmates. I think on several occasions they tried to get moved out. It was a pecking
thing. I mean they were getting on both of each other's nerves, but I did witness a lot of
times that Mack would pick at Marc Bryant" (R. 161: 127-28). Tullius didn't observe
any physical aggression from Harris, but arrogant attempts by him to agitate Bryant (R.
161: 128). Tullius felt that Bryant was more the mitigator or mediator rather than
aggressor in the interactions (R. 161: 128-29).
I. Testimony of Brian Bogart
Brian Bogart knows both Harris and Bryant from being incarcerated with them at
Purgatory (R. 161: 130). In late January-early February of 2005 he was housed in the
same section with them (R. 161: 131). Bogart testified that Harris and Bryant "didn't get
along" (R. 161: 131). Harris was "always touchy feely, always playing around, always
messing around. I knew there was problems between the two, and I think other people
knew there was problems between the two. They were trying to get separated and they
never were" (R. 161: 131). Harris would push Bryant around and Bogart couldn't tell if
it was "a bully type or whether it was a friendly type" of contact but "Bryant didn't like
it" and asked Harris to stop it and to stay away from him (R. 161: 131).
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Bogart didn't observe the fight in question between them but he watched the
officers bring both of them out and take them to medical (R. 161: 132). Afterwards, both
went to secured isolation (R. 161: 132). Bogart denied yelling or calling Harris a "F-ing
rat" (R. 161: 133).
J. Rebuttal Testimony of Mack Harris
Harris testified that the only time he ever put his hands on Bryant was "to push
him away from me and get him off of me" (R. 161: 136). Harris testified further that,
"These guys that testified said that we would come out of the cell and I was down in the
day room touchy feely, me and Mr. Bryant would never have any communication in the
day room because Mr. Bryant was always over, as they call it, their white supremacist
group" (R. 161: 136-37). Harris indicated that the "they" was "Rupp... Bogart, and also
the other gentleman" (R. 161: 137). Harris was subsequently asked the following:
"[Y]ou made a comment about a white supremacist group. What makes you believe that
they have some tendencies towards prejudices against blacks or any other group?" (R.
161: 137). Harris answered: "Well, for what it is, you can see the tattoos on Mr. Bogart.
For another thing, they all look up to Mr. Bogart as Mr. Penitentiary. He's supposed to
be Mr. Penitentiary, and they all look up to him. You can see the Aryan or supremacist
tattoos that Mr. Bogart also wears, too" (R. 161: 137). Harris indicated that Bogart once
called him a "F-ing nigger" from a distance (R. 161: 138). Harris testified furthermore
that Eskelsen and Bogart called him an "F-ing rat" after the altercation (R. 161: 138,
140).
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Bryant objected to this testimony on grounds of hearsay and that it was totally
speculative and far removed from appropriate rebuttal evidence because there was no talk
about racism in the State's case in chief (R. 161: 138-39). The trial court overruled the
objection (R. 161: 139).
Harris admitted to having a "black pride tattoo" but denied it was a "supremacist
thing" (R. 161: 140). Harris testified that the tattoo he observed on Bogart was a
"dagger" and that Bogart "explained it to him" and it was "some kind of anti-anarchy or
something like that" (R. 161: 140-41).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Bryant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting testimony during rebuttal that
there was a conspiracy to lie among defense witnesses because they were in a white
supremacist group with Bryant at the jail. Rebuttal testimony is more limited than
evidence submitted during the State's case in chief. Moreover, the testimony was filled
with hearsay and was speculative and remote. In addition, this evidence was further
inadmissible because it was character evidence precluded by rule 404(b) and any
probative value was remote and speculative and clearly outweighed by its prejudicial
effect on the jury pursuant to rule 403. If this Court finds that this issue was not
adequately preserved, it should be reviewed for plain error or ineffective assistance of
counsel. Bryant asserts that the error of the trial court in failing to weigh the probative
nature of the evidence versus its prejudicial effect was obvious and harmful; and that
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counsel was similarly deficient in failing to state with adequate specificity the nature of
his objection to the testimony in question.

ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING TESTIMONY ON
REBUTTAL THAT THE DEFENSE WITNESSES CONSPIRED TO
LIE BECAUSE THEY WERE IN A WHITE SUPREMACIST GANG
WITH BRYANT

Bryant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from Harris on
rebuttal that the defense witnesses had basically conspired to lie in their testimony based
upon their involvement with an alleged white supremacist group.
On the evening of February 1, 2005 there was an altercation between Harris and
Bryant. Harris claimed Bryant was the aggressor and any action he took was defensive.
Both men suffered injuries, however, Harris' were more extensive. Jail personnel
testified that these type of altercations are commonplace between inmates. Moreover,
Harris has a history of assaultive behavior including a 2004 conviction for assault by a
prisoner, which is what Bryant was charged with in this case.
Four other inmates testified during the presentation of the Defense's case
concerning their observations about the relationship and interactions between Harris and
Bryant while housed together at Purgatory:
Jared Eskelsen testified that on February 1, 2005 he was housed in a cell next to
Bryant (R. 161: 117). He was housed next to Bryant for approximately two weeks (R.
161: 117). Eskelsen couldn't see into that cell but he could "pretty much catch every
other word" that was said even of a light conversation (R. 161: 117). Eskelsen said that
14

just about every night Bryant and Harris would argue (R. 161: 118). On February 1,
2005 he heard "a lot of arguing, and then it led to fighting" (R. 161: 118). He heard
Harris tell Bryant "don't hang your feet over my bed. You know, this is my space. If
you don't like it you can move out, and you know, stuff like that" (R. 161: 118).
Eskelsen then heard Harris call Bryant "a bitch" and then later heard Bryant state, "Don't
hit me, Mack" (R. 161: 118-19). Afterwards, he heard wrestling, banging against the
walls, and then "[t]hey came over the speaker and told Marc he needed to exit the cell"
(R. 161: 119). The scuffling went on for 4-5 minutes (R. 161: 119). When Bryant left
the cell, he walked around the top tier for 15-20 minutes before an officer actually came
to assist (R. 161: 121). Eskelsen never heard anyone call Harris "a F-ing rat" (R. 161:
122).
John Rupp was also incarcerated at Purgatory in late January of 2005 (R. 161:
123). Rupp is acquainted with both Harris and Bryant (R. 161: 123-24). Rupp often
observed Harris "putting his hands on other people, one of them being Mr. Marc Bryant"
(R. 161: 124). Rupp described this touching as, "[S]ort of offensive like pushing around,
you know, but you weren't sure whether he was joking or if he was serious" (R. 161:
124). Rupp never observed Harris strike Bryant (R. 161: 125). Rupp never saw Bryant
push or touch Harris (R. 161: 125-26).
Anthony Tullius is also an inmate at Purgatory during late January and early
February of 2005 (R. 161: 127). Tullius knows Harris and Bryant (R. 161: 127). He
observed them interact when they were cellmates and he was housed in the same section
(R. 161: 127). "It was kind of agitated time when they were being cellmates. I think on
15

several occasions they tried to get moved out. It was a pecking thing. I mean they were
getting on both of each other's nerves, but I did witness a lot of times that Mack would
pick at Marc Bryant" (R. 161: 127-28). Tullius didn't observe any physical aggression
from Harris, but arrogant attempts by him to agitate Bryant (R. 161: 128). Tullius felt
that Bryant was more the mitigator or mediator rather than aggressor in the interactions
(R. 161: 128-29).
Brian Bogart knows both Harris and Bryant from being incarcerated with them at
Purgatory (R. 161: 130). In late January-early February of 2005 he was housed in the
same section with them (R. 161: 131). Bogart testified that Harris and Bryant "didn't get
along" (R. 161: 131). Harris was "always touchy feely, always playing around, always
messing around. I knew there was problems between the two, and I think other people
knew there was problems between the two. They were trying to get separated and they
never were" (R. 161: 131). Harris would push Bryant around and Bogart couldn't tell if
it was "a bully type or whether it was a friendly type" of contact but "Bryant didn't like
it" and asked Harris to stop it and to stay away from him (R. 161: 131).
Bogart didn't observe the fight in question between them but he watched the
officers bring both of them out and take them to medical (R. 161: 132). Afterwards, both
went to secured isolation (R. 161: 132). Bogart denied yelling or calling Harris a "F-ing
rat" (R. 161:133).
On rebuttal, Harris testified that the only time he ever put his hands on Bryant was
"to push him away from me and get him off of me" (R. 161: 136). Harris testified further
that, "These guys that testified said that we would come out of the cell and I was down in
16

the day room touchy feely, me and Mr. Bryant would never have any communication in
the day room because Mr. Bryant was always over, as they call it, their white supremacist
group" (R. 161: 136-37). Harris indicated that the "they" was "Rupp... Bogart, and also
the other gentleman" (R. 161: 137). Harris was subsequently asked the following:
"[Y]ou made a comment about a white supremacist group. What makes you believe that
they have some tendencies towards prejudices against blacks or any other group?" (R.
161: 137). Harris answered: "Well, for what it is, you can see the tattoos on Mr. Bogart.
For another thing, they all look up to Mr. Bogart as Mr. Penitentiary. He's supposed to
be Mr. Penitentiary, and they all look up to him. You can see the Aryan or supremacist
tattoos that Mr. Bogart also wears, too" (R. 161: 137). Harris indicated that Bogart once
called him a "F-ing nigger" from a distance (R. 161: 138). Harris testified furthermore
that Eskelsen and Bogart called him an "F-ing rat" after the altercation (R. 161: 138,
140).
Bryant objected to this testimony on grounds of hearsay and that it was totally
speculative and far removed from appropriate rebuttal evidence because there was no talk
about racism in the State's case in chief (R. 161: 138-39). The trial court overruled the
objection (R. 161: 139).
After the trial court overruled the objection, Harris admitted to having a "black
pride tattoo" but denied it was a "supremacist thing" (R. 161: 140). Harris testified that
the tattoo he observed on Bogart was a "dagger" and that Bogart "explained it to him"
and it was "some kind of anti-anarchy or something like that" (R. 161: 140-41).
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Bryant asserts that the trial court erred in allowing any rebuttal testimony
concerning an alleged white supremacist group based on a tattoo by one of the defense
witnesses. Essentially Harris' testimony on rebuttal is that none of the defense witnesses
should be believed because they are all part of a white supremacist group. This testimony
was based solely on a tattoo of a dagger belonging to one of the defense witnesses
(Bogart), a conversation between Harris and that witness that the tattoo was "some kind
of anti-anarchy" thing, and the fact that Bogart.
Bryant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting this testimony for several
reasons: One, because the testimony concerning what Bogart told Harris about his tattoo,
and the fact that Bogart once called Harris an "f-ing nigger," is hearsay. Two, because
the testimony is remote and speculative. Three, because the evidence is not admissible
for an appropriate noncharacter purpose under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence; and
because under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, any probative value that the testimony
had is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury."
Harris' rebuttal testimony at issue implicates rule 404(b) because it concerns the
prior bad act or conduct of a witness. The Utah Supreme Qourt has held that rule 404(b)
applies to the accused, the victim and to other witnesses. State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, f
31, 20 P.3d 271. Accordingly, his testimony concerning the racist act and conduct of
Bogart implicates rule 404(b).
Under the standard set forth in Decorso, the State "must demonstrate that the
evidence is actually being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose." State v. Decorso,
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1999 UT 57, ?21, 993 P.2d 837. "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith." Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(b). Bryant asserts that there is no
noncharacter purpose for which this remote, highly prejudicial testimony can be offered.
While the remoteness of evidence does not render it irrelevant, it may, however,
reduce its probative value. State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, f 34, 44 P.3d 805 (citation
omitted). And that is the crux of the matter here. The probative value of this testimony
was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Even if evidence is
admissible under rule 404(b), it must similarly meet the requirements of rule 403 and if
the evidence is more prejudicial than probative, it must be excluded. Vargas, 2001 UT 5
at 133.
This case turned on the credibility of Harris versus the credibility of the four
defense witnesses, who had observed the nature of the relationship and interaction
between Harris and Bryant. Harris' rebuttal testimony concerning Bogart's tattoo, his
prior racist comment, and the alleged existence of some white supremacist group because
of these Bogart's tattoo and comment is remote. It concerned Bogart, who was only one
witness out of four. Moreover, the testimony had no direct connection with Bryant other
than Bryant supposedly hung out with this group led by Bogart.
The admissibility of testimony which concerns racial motives has been previously
examined by Utah appellate courts. For example, in State v. Kelt, 2002 UT 106, 61 P.3d
1019, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of two pieces of evidence that
had underlying racial connotations.
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One, a letter by Kell that talks about what will happen when he's left alone with
African American "nigger" inmates; and how he employs a "strategy of inflicting pain on
a niggers" and how things "will be getting lively. Looks like I'll have to show me a
nappy headed monkey what some of this white power is all about. They never seem to
learn..." 2002 UT 106 at <ft34, n.6. The defense argued that the letter should not have
been admitted into evidence because it reflected badly on Kell's character but had "no
bearing on the circumstances of Blackmon's death." Id. The Utah Supreme Court
disagreed concluding that "[w]hile the letter may have prejudicial effects, it does not fall
within the evidence that is inherently prejudicial, and it has high probative value. Thus
the [trial] court's actions were in accord with rule 403's presumption of admissibility."
Id
The second piece of evidence examined by the court in Kell concerned rebuttal
testimony—like is present here. On rebuttal, fellow inmate, Franciso Colon, testified that
after witnessing the homicide he heard Kell say, "That's white power. [I have] been
killing' niggers ever since [I] was an bitty-bitty Aryan." 2002 UT 106 at f 38. The Utah
Supreme Court concluded that, "This testimony had significant probative value to rebut
defendant's claim that the attack was not racially motivated. Thus, it was highly relevant
and not unduly prejudicial. Id.
Bryant asserts that this case is distinguishable from Kell and compels this Court to
reach a different result concerning Harris' testimony on rebuttal. First, the probative
value of Harris' testimony on rebuttal which implied that defendant and all four defense
witnesses conspired to lie because of their membership in a white supremacist group is
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not significant. Prior to the rebuttal testimony, no mention of race had been made during
trial. Harris made no mention of racial hatred or motivation during his earlier testimony.
He never testified that Bryant called him names or that the altercation had anything to do
with race. Moreover, the officers testified that while they heard other inmates call Harris
an "f-ing rat," they made no mention of racial slurs that were directed towards Harris; and
in fact, they couldn't specify exactly which inmates were yelling at Harris.
After the close of the State's case, Harris' credibility was put into question by four
fellow inmates, who had observed the relationship and interactions between Harris and
Bryant. Eskelsen testified that he heard Bryant and Harris argue about every night while
he was housed in an adjacent cell (R. 161: 118). During the altercation, he heard Harris
call Bryant "a bitch" and later heard Bryant state, "Don't hit me, Mack" (R. 161: 118-19).
Tullius also testified as to the contentious nature of the relationship between Bryant and
Harris and how, "It was a pecking thing. I mean they were getting on both of each
other's nerves" (R. 161: 127-28). However, Tullius also observed that Harris would
"pick at" Bryant and try to agitate him; and he believed that Bryant was more the
mediator rather than the aggressor (R. 161: 128). Rupp testified that Harris often was
"putting his hands on people... [S]ort of offensive like pushing around, you know, but
you weren't sure whether he was joking or if he was serious" (R. 161: 124). Likewise,
Bogart testified that Bryant and Harris "didn't get along;" and that Harris would push
Bryant around and he couldn't tell if it was "a bully type or whether it was a friendly
type" of contact (R. 161: 131). Bogart denied calling Harris a "F-ing rat" (R. 161: 133)
while Eskelsen never heard use those words towards Harris (R. 161: 122).
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It is only after Harris' credibility as the non-aggressor in his relationship with
Bryant was called in question, only after his past history of assaultive behavior had been
introduced, that Harris essentially testified that the defense witnesses couldn't be believed
because they were all part of a white supremacist group. Bryant asserts that the probative
value of this testimony is not significant—particularly as Harris' testimony is allegedly
based only on a tattoo of one of the four witnesses that in reality may or may not have
any type of racial symbolism and one past comment of that same witness calling him a
"f-ing nigger."
And clearly, any probative value in this evidence is significantly outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. Unlike Kell, neither the State nor the defense in their case in chief,
raised or relied on race as an issue in this altercation. Additionally, unlike Kelt, it is not
the conduct of the defendant that is directly implicated in this testimony. This testimony
concerns at most conduct by one witness—one witness out of four. And yet, the nature
of the allegation that all are involved in a white supremacist groups unfairly and
improperly undermined the credibility of all four witnesses and the defendant with the
jury. Witness credibility in this case is critical and Harris' rebuttal testimony, which
implied that the defense witnesses could not be trusted to testify truthfully or accurately
because they were all associated with a white supremacist group unfairly prejudiced the
jury. Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to overrule the objection of the
defendant and admit such testimony into evidence.
Although Bryant's counsel objected to this testimony at trial, he did not
specifically state that the evidence was inadmissible as prior bad acts under rule 403,
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Utah Rules of Evidence. Moreover, it was towards the end of the rebuttal testimony that
Bryant's counsel made his objected. If this Court determines that this issue was not
preserved for appeal, Bryant asserts that the trial court committed plain error by allowing
this testimony and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contemporaneously object
with specificity to this testimony. Where the complaining party failed to make a timely
objection, we review the trial court's rulings for plain error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1208-09 (Utah 1993).
When arguing plain error and ineffectiveness in regards to a single issue on
appeal, the same standard of review applies to both. See State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170,
174 (Utah App. 1992) (stating common standard of review is applicable when defendant
raises both plain error and ineffective assistance arguments).
"To establish plain error, Defendant must show: '(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant....'"
Dominguez, 2003 UT App 138 at 125 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah
1993)).
As shown above, the trial court erred in admitting evidence in Harris' rebuttal
testimony concerning the existence of a white supremacist group that Bryant and all four
defense witnesses allegedly belonged under rules 404(b) and 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence. This error should have been obvious to the trial court.
At the very least, since 1999, trial courts have been on notice that when deciding
the admissibility of evidence under rule 404(b), a three step analysis is required: "[I]n
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deciding whether evidence of other crimes is admissible under rule 404(b), the trial court
must determine (1) whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter
purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and
(3) whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403. State v. Decorso, 1999 UT
57, f 20, 993 P.2d 837. Yet despite Bryant's objection to the admissibility of this
evidence, the trial court failed to properly analyze the admissibility of this evidence.
Accordingly, this error was also harmful to Bryant and should undermine this
Court's confidence in the verdict. As shown above, there were no eyewitnesses to the
altercation between Bryant and Harris. This case turned on the credibility of the
witnesses. Absent the highly inflammatory, prejudicial statements made by Harris on
rebuttal, his credibility was greatly undermined by his history of assaultive behavior and
by the testimony of four witnesses, who had observed his interactions with Bryant and
had testified that he was the aggressor in their relationship and the one who sought to
"pick at" and "agitate" Bryant. Accordingly, he asserts that he was prejudiced by this
inadmissible testimony and that absent its admission there was a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable result at trial. Therefore, the trial court committed plain error in
admitting the testimony at issue here; and trial counsel was similarly ineffective for
failing to contemporaneously object with sufficient specificity to the admission of this
evidence.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Bryant requests that this Court reverse his conviction for assault by a prisoner and
remand this case to the Fifth District Court for further proceedings.
th

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30m day of October, 2006.

Margaret/P: Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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192 East 200 North. Suite 202
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Telephone (435) 634-1000
Facsimile (435)627-8505
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE FTFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WASHINGTON COUNTY, ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs
MARC C BRYANT,
Defendant.

CASE NUMBER 051500253
Honorable Eric A. Ludlow

COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney Aric Cramer, and hereby files this
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Arrest Judgment Under Rule 23 of the Utah R. Crim. P., the
Court can arrest Judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the
defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Defendant claims
that there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment.
Four errors exist in which the Court overruled objections by the Defendant that should have
been sustained. The Defendant feels these objections that were overruled allowed in evidence that
brings into question the validity of the jury's verdict The evidence admitted and placed before the
jury caused them to be prejudiced and swayed by evidence that was irrelevant

OBJECTION NO. 1
The good cause for the arrest of judgment is an objection that is contained in pages 77 and
78 of the transcript.
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{Examination by Mr. Shaum)
Q. After you were separated, had you had any other contact
with Mr. Bryant?
{WitnessMr. Harris)
A. Oh, yeah. They put - - after they put us in lock down
for fighting - - because that's one of the rules they do out there
at purgatory- They put you in lock down for fighting until they,
you know, figure out the situation.
But Mr. Bryant was already in A block, and then they
brought me into A block after they brought me back from medical.
He turned around and he was yelling up one of the second tier
telling them - - telling me to tell them that - Mr. Cramer; Well, your Honor, I'm going to object. I
don't understand what happened after the fight has any relevance
as to the fight, which is the assault. I mean this is all - The Witness: He was making - The Court: Well, hang on, Mr. Harris. Hold on.
Mr. Cramer: It's just all irrelevant.
The Court: Mr. Shaum?
Mr. Shaum: It certainly has relevance to how the
defendant wanted this characterized, if he made any statements at
all to Mr. Harris about how he should report his particular
assault.
The Court: The Court is going to overrule the
objection.
The Witness: Yes. He was yelling through his cell
block saying it don't matter what - - he said, "No matter what - no matter where you are or, you know, any time you - - if you go
to class or you do anything, I'm going to get you. You better
tell them that it was horseplay." You know, just tell them it
was horseplay. Just tell them it was horseplay over and over
again.

(See Pages 77-78 of Jury Trial transcript).
Utah R. Evid. Rule 401 states that "relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency
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to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." The statements submitted to the
jury by Mr. Harris would pass 401 muster.
However, Utah R. Evid. Rule 402 states "all relevant evidence is admissible except as
otherwise provided in the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in Courts of this state. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible." The trial court has given considerable discretion in determining whether
or not evidence submitted is relevant. Bambroughv, Bethers, 552P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). However,
if the evidence has no bearing on the Defendant's guilt or innocence, it should be excluded and it is
an abuse of discretion to admit it. What the Defendant may have said to Mr. Harris after Mr. Harris'
return from medical has no bearing on whether the Defendant was guilty of the assault in the first
place. Therefore, the Court was in error and abused its discretion by allowing this evidence to come
in. This evidence improperly influenced the jury against the Defendant. The evidence would have
been admissible or relevant if the Defendant had been charged with witness tampering, but that is
not the charge with which he was tried. Therefore, the Court should arrest the judgment due to the
error in overruling the Defendant's objection to this evidence.
OBJECTION NO, 2
Defendant objected to the State introducing photographs taken of Mr. Harris and the
objection was placed as follows on page 81 of the trial transcript.
1
2
3
4
5

Mr. Shaum: The Sate moves for admission of State's 1,
2 and 3.
Mr. Cramer: Objection to No. 2, your Honor, but no
problem with No. 1 and No. 3
The Court: What is the objection to No. 2?
3

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Mr. Cramer: Cumulative evidence, plus I think under the
Lafferty case the Court there stated that close-up color photos
can be too provocative. I don't know for another word - - tend to
inflame the jury. Number 1 sufficiently covers what the injuries
that Mr. Harris has described, so I don't think - The Court: Counsel, I've not seen the photographs, but
the Court is going to overrule the objection. The Court is going
to admit State's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.
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(Exhibit Nos. 1 through 3 received into evidence)

(See Page 81 of Jury Trial transcript).
This objection essentially contains two areas where counsel objected and a third area where
the Court erred. The first objection under this section is that the photograph was cumulative
evidence. The second part of the objection was that picture no. 2 was grotesque and, therefore,
should have been excluded. The third area of error in this objection is the fact that the Court did not
see the photographs after the objection was made, but admitted them without review.
Cumulative evidence is a Utah R. Evid. Rule 403 issue. Rule 403 states "although relevant
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." The test for cumulative evidence is a
balancing test. The balancing test of this rule excludes matters of scant or cumulative probative
force dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect. State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Defendant argues that the photograph in the case herein was of scant or
cumulative probative force in that Mr. Harris already testified as to what his injuries were and
photograph exhibit no. 1 was sufficient to point out those injuries and this photograph was
essentially "dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect."
The second part of the objection was an argument in the alternative that the picture was
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grotesque under that definition Counsel cited to the Lqfferty decision which has been subsequently
updated, affirmed and clarified in the DeCorso case State v. DeCorso, 993 P 2d 837, cert denied,
528 U S 1164, 120 S Ct 1181, 145 L E 2d 1088 (2000) The first item that Courts consider is
whether the photograph was in color or black and white because color photographs are generally
more disturbing because of their ability to provide the viewer with vivid images of blood, wounds,
bruising and the like The photograph no 2 was in color The second item that Courts consider is
whether the photograph was an enlargement or a close-up shot because they show more detail and
are often more disturbing than a life-like view

This photograph was not a close-up or an

enlargement The third item that Courts look at is whether it was taken in relation to the crime and
whether it depicts the victim as found at the crime scene These items are met in this exhibit The
fourth consideration is whether details in the photograph other than the victim may render it
gruesome That is not an issue in this photograph
Therefore, under the case law analysis, the Court would have had to have determined under
the first test whether the nature of the color photograph made it gruesome If the Court determined
it was not gruesome, then it would still have to do the balancing act under Rule 403 which has
already ben discussed
Third and finally, however, these first two arguments are truly moot in this point, due to the
fact that the Court indicated it had not even observed the photographs in order to make a
determination under the first or second arguments presented by counsel Clearly, the Court could
not make a determination under either of those Rules having never observed the photograph This
is a clear abuse of discretion, wherein the Court merely admitted it due to the fact that the
prosecution had offered it

Therefore, the Defendant feels that this is the strongest and most
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compelling argument for an arrest of judgment under this claimed error to the second objection
overruled in this case
OBJECTION NO. 3
The third objection that was overruled is laid out in pages 90 and 91 of the transcript.
In its direct examination of Deputy Justin Seegmiller, the State asked the following series of
questions:
{Examination by Mr. Shaum)
25
Q.
How would you describe his injuries compared to the
1
injuries that Mr. Bryant had suffered?
{Witness Deputy Just Seegmiller)
2
A.
Well, compared to - - Bryant's was very minimal compared
3
to Mack Harris'.
4
Mr. Cramer: Your Honor, I'm going to object to this.
5
I don't see what the relevance is between the difference of
6
injuries.
7
The Court: Mr. Shaum?
8
Mr. Shaum: I believe it goes to who was the aggressor
9
in the situation.
10
The Court: The Court finds that it is relevant. The
11

Court is going to overrule the objection.

(See Pages 90-91 of Jury Trial transcript).
Here the State had indicated that the relevance of the injuries between the Defendant and Mr.
Harris was evidence as to who was the first aggressor. The Defendant claims that the Court did
abuse its discretion in this issue. The relevance of this issue is very remote. There is no evidence
or other reason, scientific or otherwise, to show that the number of injuries or extent of injuries is
an indicator of who started a fight between to combatants. The assumption that the person with the
greatest injuries was not the first aggressor is not something that the Court can take judicial notice
of, which is essentially what happened here. Due to the fact that the evidence as presented was too
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remote to be relevant to prove that fact or serve as a piece of evidence to prove that fact makes that
argument that was submitted to the Court and accepted, a reversable error and, therefore, the Court
should grant the Defendant's request to arrest the judgment on this issue as well
OBJECTION NO. 4
The final objection that came before the Court that was overruled came during the direct
examination of Mr. Harris during his rebuttal testimony which is contained in pages 136 through
142. The essence of the testimony was that Mr. Harris indicated that the witnesses called on behalf
of Mr. Bryant did not testify truthfully because they were white supremacists. Mr Harris based his
opinion on this matter due to the fact that one of the witnesses indicated to him that a knife shaped
tattoo on his leg was a white supremacist tattoo. The objection that was made was to hearsay which
the Court overruled. The argument on this objection's alleged error is two-fold. First, that Mr.
Harris' statements of what someone told him in the jail was a white supremacist tattoo was clear
hearsay and there is no exception for the allowance of that evidence to come in over the hearsay
nature of this statement.
The second argument is that Mr. Harris is essentially testifying as an expert as to his
knowledge of what those tattoos mean and, although the objection made by counsel for the
Defendant was not one based on Rule 703, the Court should have known that this was plain error
and that type of an opinion could not be rendered. Although the objection was based on a hearsay
argument, the argument could also have been made under Rule 702. Even though the 702 objection
was hot made, the Court could and should have observed that this was an area that required expert
opinion and no foundation had been laid for Mr. Harris' knowledge as to what white supremacist
tattoos were or looked like. Therefore, this entire testimony should not have been placed before the
7
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jury and it caused an error in the trial
CONCLUSION
Therefore, because four objections that were made and incorrectly overruled, evidence came
into the trial that individually each was sufficient grounds under Rule 23 of the Utah R Crim P to
allow a new trial to be held and judgment on this case be arrested Even if these individual errors
were insufficient in and of themselves to create error, in the aggregate and the total, all these errors
combined were sufficient that the jury was tainted by evidence that should not have been admitted
Therefore, there verdict should be set aside an^Jhe judgment arrested
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

<-^

day of September, 200i
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^Cramer
Attorney for Defendant

